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COMMENTARY
THE NEED FOR SELF-IMPOSED QUOTAS IN
ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT
HERMA HILL KAY*
Encouraged by Professor Edwards' thesis that the Constitution per-
mits voluntary affirmative action to redress past societal discrimination,
at least pending the decision in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Chemical
Corp.,' I propose an extension of the argument to the context of aca-
demic employment. My argument that a need exists for self-imposed
quotas in academic employment is based upon four propositions.
First, there presently exists a nationwide and, I think, uncontroverted
dearth of women and minority professors in academic institutions.
This proposition applies to all levels of higher education, but it is most
apparent at prestigious public and private research universities. The
deficiency, particularly in the case of minority professors, is in part due
to prior discrimination in college and graduate school admissions, but
it is also partially due to the faculty hiring process. Second, the current
budgetary restrictions imposed on public universities and the decline in
support for private universities, coupled with projected demographic
changes in age distribution, will mean less entry-level hiring in the fu-
ture. Third, the move to raise or eliminate the mandatory retirement
age for existing faculty members, while salutary in many respects, will
also tend to restrict entry-level hiring and promotions in the immediate
future. Finally, federal legislation enacted to redress discrimination in
academic employment in 1972 has been ineffective. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 amended in 19721 to apply to institutions of
higher education, is a dead letter in individual actions brought against
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A., 1956, Southern Methodist
University; J.D., 1959, University of Chicago.
1. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 720 (1978) (No. 78-435).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976)).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
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academic institutions. There is also good reason to believe that Title
IX4 will be interpreted not to apply to academic employment at all.
Similarly, while the Executive Orders5 have been useful in establishing
goals and timetables in some cases, the lack of adequately trained staff
and the lack of efficient investigative and enforcement authority have
hampered many efforts.
Given these propositions, the only feasible method that I can foresee
to produce significant numbers of female and minority professors in the
future is for academic institutions to leave positions unfilled while un-
dertaking vigorous and determined searches for qualified candidates.
Moreover, once these candidates are identified and hired, academic in-
stitutions should provide special support, where necessary, in the form
of initially reduced teaching and committee assignments to enable
them to have adequate time for research and publication. Care must
be taken to assure procedural fairness at the tenure review stage, and
attention must be given to avoid salary inequity.
Statistical Data and Hiring Policy
Having summarized my argument, let me present the supporting evi-
dence.6 A survey conducted by the American Association of University
Women (AAUW) indicates that women now hold 16.5% of tenured po-
sitions compared to 16% in 1973. 7 They constitute 8% of full professors
and 16% of associate professors.8 The study shows more tenured wo-
men at smaller institutions-28% at colleges enrolling less than 1000
students-and fewer at large institutions-14% where the student body
exceeds 10,000. 9
The pattern holds true for law schools as well. American Bar Associ-
ation data for 1975-76 show women holding 8.9% of full-time faculty
4. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(a), 86 Stat. 375 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000c (1976)).
5. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
6. I wish to acknowledge my debt to three of my former students, now graduates of Boalt
Hall, who wrote papers in my course on Sex-Based Discrimination. They are Elizabeth Thomas,
D. Kelly Weisberg, and Hilary Kelly, all class of 1978. Ms. Weisberg's paper, Women ia Law
School Teaching: Problems and Progress, appears in 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 226 (1979). Ms. Thomas'
paper, Title VII in the Ivory Tower: Judicial Treatment a/Illegal Discrimination in Faculty Hiring,
has been submitted for publication in the CALtF. L. REV.
7. Chronicle of Higher Education, April 17, 1978, at 14, cols. 1-3. The survey comprised
600 four-year colleges.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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positions.'" Analyzed by Ms. Weisberg, however, these figures disclose
that the "top ten" law schools had an average of only 4.8% women on
their faculties, little more than half the national average." Women
holding the rank of full professor constituted just 3.8% of the total, 14%
of whom were law librarians.' 2 Moreover, these averages conceal the
surprising fact that 49% of all accredited law schools employed no more
than one woman during 1975-76.' 3
Comparable statistics for minority faculty members are difficult to
obtain and probably contain reporting errors. The 1972-73 survey con-
ducted by the American Council on Education indicated that minority
faculty members numbered 2,580, or 5.5% of total faculty member-
ship-1.84% Black, 0.55% Native American, 0.32% Mexican-Spanish
surname, 1.8% Oriental, and 0.99% "other minority."'" The 1976 An-
nual Newsletter of the American Association of Law Schools showed
202 full-time minority group teachers and administrators out of a total
of 5,337, or 3.787-2.52% Black, 0.3% Asian, 0.02% Chicano, 0.03%
Puerto Rican, 0.02% other Hispanic-American, and 0.00% Native
American. ts
It is generally agreed that the availability pools for women are larger
than those for minorities. Nonetheless, the discrepancies for women
are not disappearing. Nor is this surprising. As the 1973 Carnegie
Commission report, Opportunities for Women in Higher Education,
pointed out, in a system with low faculty turnover the hiring ratio nec-
essary to achieve adequate employment of women by the end of the
decade, and by extension, adequate employment of minorities, would
have to be set much higher than the ratio in current availability pools.' 6
Given existing patterns of faculty recruitment, such an effort is
unlikely.
At most institutions, faculty hiring begins at the departmental level.
10. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAW SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS: A
REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES-FALL 1976, at 49 (1976).
11. Weisberg, supra note 6, at 228.
12. Id. at 229.
13. Id. at 233.
14. BAYxER, Teaching Faculty in 4cademe: 1972-73, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, 8
Rcscarch Reports, Nos. 2 & 31 (1973). For data concerning availability pools, see McCarthy &
Wolfe, Doctorates Granted to Women and Minoritx, Group Members, 189 ScI. 856 (1975).
15. Association of American Law Schools. Newsletter No. 76-1 (Feb. 27, 1976).
16. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 124-26 (1973).
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The department's choice of candidates at the instructor, or even the
assistant professor, level frequently is not subject to review by campus-
wide faculty or administrative bodies, although the affirmative action
officer usually must be satisfied that the department conducted a good
faith search for women or minority candidates. In most cases, the new
appointee is either a graduate student who has recently completed, or is
in the process of completing, a Ph.D. program and whose work is
known primarily to his or her (usually white male) professors.
In the case of law schools, a year or two of experience in a judicial
clerkship or large law firm adds another source of evaluation-also
largely by white males-to that of the home school teachers. Many
have voiced complaints about the "old boy network," but the institu-
tional forces that maintain it are still present: the professors, judges,
and senior partners who know the candidates, and whose judgment is
sought out and given credence by their counterparts in other institu-
tions, are overwhelmingly white and male. The tendency to recognize
intellectual power and unusual capacity for creative scholarship more
easily in persons of one's own sex and race and in persons who can be
viewed most comfortably as one's proteges is perfectly natural.
Moreover, appointments tend to be made individually, not in groups.
Although each candidate is evaluated against the field, the competitive
bidding among universities for "targets of opportunity" seems to bear
more resemblance to the vying of college football coaches for a star
high school quarterback than to the sober assessment of a scholar's po-
tential. Asking a predominately white male faculty to forego the ap-
pointment of a young white male "superstar" to continue the search for
seemingly elusive female or minority candidates is not likely to succeed
in the absence of a formulated plan voluntarily accepted in advance by
that faculty.
Budgetary Restrictions
Surely I need not pause long over the critical budgetary situation
facing all but a very few institutions of higher education; nor need I
point out the increased difficulty of persuading able law graduates to
choose teaching over practice. Cases such as Krotkoff v. Goucher Col-
lege, 7 which upheld the dismissal of a tenured female professor on
grounds of financial exigency, are likely to become all too common.
17. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
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Goucher was supported in its defense by the American Council on Ed-
ucation (ACE) and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) as amicii curiae. Both were evidently seeking to preserve the
concept of tenure in situations viewed as more critical by refusing to
assert it in this case. After all, without students to provide tuition and
fees, and in the absence of large numbers of generous private donors,
private colleges, like private businesses, must be able to go out of oper-
ation--department by department, if necessary. The situation of many
publicly financed institutions is different only in that the decision to cut
back is made outside of the ivory tower, rather than within.
Compulsory Retirement
The elimination of the compulsory retirement age deserves slightly
more extended comment. Federal law prohibits a mandatory retire-
ment age of less than seventy for most employees.' A special exemp-
tion permits a lower mandatory retirement age for "tenured
employees" until July 1, 1982.19 The exemption represents a compro-
mise between those, including most of the major research institutions
and ACE, that wanted a total exclusion for faculty, and those, includ-
ing the bill's sponsors and AAUP, that thought professors should be
treated like other employees.
According to ACE's assistant general counsel, Laura Ford, higher
education's case for different treatment rested on two grounds.2" First,
higher education will experience a unique demographic warp created
by the confluence of two factors: the expansive faculty hiring that took
place in the late 1950's and 1960's, which has produced a "bulge" of
recently tenured faculty members in their middle forties who will not
be retiring until the end of the century; and the decline in enrollments
projected to begin in the early 1980's. Taken together, these factors will
produce a situation in which faculty turnover will be limited to death
or retirement.
The second crucial difference for universities, according to Ford, is
the existence of tenure, which, coupled with a system of peer review,
virtually precludes termination of faculty members for "cause." The
bottom line is that universities can expect to face severe restrictions on
18 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 12(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 631 (West Supp. 1978)).
19. Id. §§ 12(b)(3), 12(d).
20. Ford, The Battle Over Mandatory Retirement, 59 EDuc. REC. 204 (1978).
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"faculty renewal" in the near future-and faculty renewal, in this con-
text, also includes affirmative action through new hires.
Additionally, there is wide speculation that university administra-
tors, having won the battle of the exclusion, may be losing the war
against mandatory retirement. Many faculty members, including those
in the age cohorts affected by the exemption, feel the exemption is un-
fair. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology already has an-
nounced that it will not rely upon the exemption, but will immediately
raise its retirement age to seventy.2  While AAU and ACE have under-
taken efforts to extend the exemption beyond 1982,2 AAUP seeks its
elimination.2 3 Both efforts may be preempted by Congressman Pep-
per's attempt to eliminate the mandatory retirement age for all employ-
ees. 4 Taking account of these and other possibilities, proposals are
currently under consideration for phased retirement plans that would
permit senior faculty members to continue to teach at reduced loads
and to enjoy support facilities in order to make available a portion of
their full-time equivalency (FTE) for new appointments.
Relative Ineffectiveness of Individual Lawsuits
Legal remedies for individual plaintiffs charging discrimination in
the academic context are virtually nonexistent. After reviewing more
than sixty reported cases in 1978, Elizabeth Thomas found only four in
which plaintiffs succeeded on the merits.25 Subsequently, two of those
cases were vacated and remanded. 26 Her most significant conclusion,
however, was not that plaintiffs lost, but that federal district courts,
which have played the leading role in making Title VII effective in the
21. Retirement Raised to 70for Faculty, Tech. Talk, July 26, 1978, at 1.
22. Report of Joint Academic Senate-Administration Committee on Faculty Retirement,
Univ. of Cal., at 4 (Feb. 22, 1979).
23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. No. 4, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), would repeal the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1975), and amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of age
for persons over 40. See also H.R. REP. No. 70, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
25. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169 (Ist Cir.), vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct.
295 (1978); Mecklenburg v. Montana Bd. of Regents, [1977] 13 EMPL. PRAc. Doc. (CCH) 11,438
(D. Mont. 1976); Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Va. 1976); Cramer v. Virginia Com-
monwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1978).
26. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded, 99 S, Ct.
295 (1978); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated
and remanded, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978).
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industrial context, have failed abysmally in applying the same careful
judicial scrutiny to academic cases. Nor has this contrast escaped the
notice of some appellate courts. Judge Tuttle, sitting by designation in
the First Circuit and participating in one of the four cases in which a
plaintiff won, Sweeney v. Board of Trustees,27 pointed out that most
female plaintiffs challenging sex discrimination in academia lost. He
went on to observe:
[W]e voice misgivings over one theme recurrent in those opinions: the
notion that courts should keep "hands oXf' the salary, promotion, and
hiring decisions of colleges and universities. This reluctance no doubt
arises from the courts' recognition that hiring, promotion, and tenure de-
cisions require subjective evaluation most appropriately made by persons
thoroughly familiar with the academic setting. Nevertheless, we caution
against permitting judicial deference to result in judicial abdication of a
responsibility entrusted to the courts by Congress. That responsibility is
simply to provide a forum for the litigation of complaints of sex discrimi-
nation in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other Title VII
suits. 28
Sweeney was subsequently reversed 29 per curiam by a five-to-four vote
of the United States Supreme Court for failure to follow the precise
standard of proof in Title VII cases established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green3" and reaffirmed in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Wa-
ters,3' both arising in industrial settings.
The failure of academic plaintiffs is not limited to white females. My
own review of recent federal court decisions discloses failure on the
merits in two cases involving black women suing predominately white
schools; 32 one case of a black male suing a university that did not have
either black students or black faculty prior to 194831 and one case of a
white male suing a predominately black college.34
In one of the recent cases, Powell v. Syracuse University,35 a Second
27. 569 F.2d 169 (Ist Cir. 1978).
28, Id at 176.
29. 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978).
30. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
31. 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978).
32, Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. University of
Md., 438 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1977).
33. Scott v. University of Del., 455 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Del. 1978).
34, Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Miss. 1977). This example represents
an apparently growing problem. See Middleton, Black Colleges Guilty of Racism, Chronicle of
Higher Education, Dec. 11, 1978, at 3.
35. 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Circuit panel attempted to modify its position taken in an earlier opin-
ion in Faro v. New York Universiy,36 the leading case establishing a
noninterventionist policy in academic cases. Quoting the earlier state-
ment in Faro that, "[o]f all fields, which the federal courts should hesi-
tate to invade and take over, education and faculty appointments at a
University level are probably the least suited for federal court supervi-
sion,"' 37 Judge Smith noted that its effect in practice had been to render
"colleges and universities virtually immune to charges of employment
bias, at least when that bias is not expressed overtly." 38 Noting that
Congress, by extending Title VII to educational institutions in 1972,
had "instructed us to be particularly sensitivd to evidence of academic
bias,"'39 Judge Smith quoted with approval Judge Tuttle's language
from Sweeney prior to its reversal to conclude that, "[i]t is our task,
then, to steer a careful course between excessive intervention in the af-
fairs of the university and the unwarranted tolerance of unlawful be-
havior. Faro does not, and was never intended to, indicate that
academic freedom embraces the freedom to discriminate. 40
Judge Moore, the author of the Faro opinion, did not agree with the
retreat. Concurring in the judgment that Syracuse University had suc-
cessfully rebutted Ms. Powell's prima facie case, he disclaimed the ma-
jority's "dicta":
Any reluctance of the federal courts to interfere with the decision-mak-
ing process of universities does not come from an interest in promoting
discrimination. Rather, such reluctance reflects the inability of the courts
to perform "a discriminating analysis of the qualifications of each candi-
date for hiring or advancement, taking into consideration his or her edu-
cational experience, the specifications of the particular position open and,
of great importance, the personality of the candidate." 41
Despite Judge Moore's disclaimer, however, it is clear that courts can
and do probe employment decisions in academia with the same skill
used in other settings. Although there are many who disagree with the
outcome, few have faulted the detailed and careful review of the evi-
dence provided by Judge Knox in Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh.42
36. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
37. id at 1231-32.
38. 580 F.2d at 1153.
39. Id at 1154.
40. Id
41. Id at 1157; Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974).
42. 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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Ms. Thomas' paper, which has been submitted for publication,43
contains valuable suggestions for adapting the burden of proof devel-
oped in industrial cases to the academic context. While her model, if
implemented, would certainly enable federal district courts to dis-
charge their responsibilities more satisfactorily in Title VII academic
cases, litigation by an individual faculty member must always be a last
resort. In view of the inevitable discomfort for the plaintiff and his or
her colleagues, the high cost of litigation, the time consumed in trial
and trial preparation, the slight chance of ultimate success, the almost
certain damage to even the successful plaintiffs academic career, and
the strains placed upon the defending institution, the path of individual
litigation is not to be recommended lightly.
I do not believe, however, that the task of increasing the numbers of
women and minority faculty members can be left solely to the normal
recruitment processes. Despite heightened sensitivity to the matter by
most white male professors, created in part by the paperwork made
necessary by annual contract compliance reports, there still seems to be
a gap between abstract good intentions and hiring decisions in particu-
lar cases.
My view is that the least detrimental institutional way of closing this
gap is for a department to decide, in advance, that faculty positions will
be targeted for female and minority appointments. Advocates of af-
firmative action can then be reassured that the good will of their col-
leagues will not be worn thin by continuous reiteration of the argument
each time a white male candidate is presented for consideration. More-
over, those whose chief concern is the maintenance-and indeed, the
improvement-of intellectual standards can undertake their search for
qualified female and minority candidates on the assurance that differ-
ent standards will not be applied to the targeted appointments. In a
work environment in which intellectual and collegial interaction and
respect is highly prized, the voluntary adoption of such a policy would
go far towards alleviating the present strains caused by past societal
neglect of the qualities and aspirations of women and minority group
members.
43. Thomas, supra note 6.
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